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o a n e v i s s e r A N D d o n k a l b
Financialised Capitalism Soviet Style?
Varieties of State Capture and Crisis *
Abstract
Looking for new ways to interpret the failings of the neo-liberal economy, this article
argues that financialised capitalism at the eve of the 2008 financial crisis showed
striking analogies with the characteristic combination of oligopoly and informality of
the Soviet economy at the eve of its collapse. State capture by oligopolists, a large
"virtual economy", the inability of agencies to obtain insight into economic and
financial operations, the short term orientations of managers not coinciding with
enterprise viability, and a "mystification of risk" by high science are some of the
analogies to be discussed. It is argued that not only the origins but also the aftermath
of the crisis may show significant analogies.
Keywords: Capitalism, Planned Economy, Financial Crisis, State Capture,
Informality.
T h e f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s has caused a swift decline of neo-
liberal intellectual hegemony, leaving us with a rather uncertain
collection of visions on the current state of affairs. Most policy
proposals and arguments focus on, first, imposing more regulatory
control on the financial sector (by states or other controlling agencies)
or, second, the need for a new ethic within the financial sector (or
business and society at large), whether inspired by sustainability,
corporate responsibility, ‘‘soft law’’ or other discourses.Most observers
correctly state that the incentive structure within the financial sector
must be changed to limit excessive risk taking and short-termism.
* This piece emerged from an ongoing conversation between Visser as an analyst of Soviet/
Russian agriculture and Kalb who was studying postsocialist Poland as well as current
processes in global capitalism. The authors thank commentators at seminars at Central
European University, Budapest, in particular Jakob Rigi and Chris Henning, the Institute for
Social Studies in the Hague, and the Department of Anthropology of the University of Bergen,
in particular Bruce Kapferer, as well as William Meyers and other commentators at
a presentation at the AAASS Convention 2009, Boston. Further, the article benefited from
comments by Alexander Nikulin and the journal’s reviewers.
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However, while all this makes some sense, we note that there is a dearth
of new intellectual paradigms to enable a fresh, fundamental analysis
and rethinking of the current trajectory of Western capitalism.1 Many
critiques of globalized, financial-sector dominated capitalism remain
firmly grounded within a capitalist discourse, portraying current neo-
liberal capitalism as simply a slight aberration of a capitalism assumed to
be sound that, as Adam Smith warned, might just need some stronger
moral policing. Terms like ‘‘turbo-capitalism’’, ‘‘casino capitalism’’ or
‘‘jackpot capitalism’’ have rapidly become common terminology in the
mainstream press since 2008. It indicates that we have rediscovered the
moralist side of Adam Smith in addition to Smith’s ‘‘invisible hand’’ of
maximization of benefits for all through self-interested individual behav-
ior.2 In a more nuanced tone the new ‘‘behavioural economics’’, so well
represented in Obama’s White House, argues in principle the same3.
A stronger fatherly hand combined with a bit more state, and capitalism
can steam ahead again. There is little scrutiny on offer of how the
combination of financialisation and globalization is dramatically chang-
ing the system from within.
This article tries to contribute to a rethinking of the issues, not by
studying the phenomenon of financialisation and globalization head on
– which has been done well by historical sociologists such as the late
Giovanni Arrighi (1994, 2000) and the comparativist anthropologist
Jonathan Friedman (Friedman and Friedman 2008a and 2008b; see in
general also Kalb 2005), with whose general claims we tend to agree –
but by making a side step: we use a comparison with the planned
1 ‘‘Western capitalism’’ of course is not
a homogeneous category in reality. While
most of the phenomena described in this
article are characteristic of the US and the
EU-countries, this is less so for Canada and
Australia. These ‘‘deviant cases’’, however,
confirm the general argument. Canada, for
instance, actively restricted concentration
within its financial sector. As a result state
capture by the financial sector was largely
avoided. Despite its strong linkages with the
US economy, Canada had no bankruptcies or
bail-outs of major financial institutions dur-
ing the financial crisis.
2 It should be noted that the term casino
in Strange’s (1986) analysis referred primar-
ily to the fact that markets for the first time in
history functioned 24 hours a day, although
she also dwelled on the aspects of speculation
and gambling in global finance in this study
and later publications.
3 The influence and ideas of behavioural
economists within the Obama administration,
such as White House budget director Peter
Orszag and regulatory official Cass Sunstein
(co-author of Nudge, an influential behaviour-
alist study), are described for instance by
Dorning (2010). Instead of a laissez-
fair approach, these policy makers advocate
more state involvement to nudge citizens into
‘‘better’’ (more healthy, economically sound)
lifestyles. The primacy of the market mecha-
nism is not questioned. It only should be
complemented with regulations that take into
account ‘‘predictable irrationality’’, instead of
assuming universal economic rationality as
within neoclassical economics. How financial-
ization and globalisation are dramatically
changing the system from within, and also
undermining the power of the state to regu-
late, are major issues which receive little
attention.
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economy of the Soviet Union in order to argue that the actual
workings of the neo-liberal, globalised economy at the eve of the
2008 financial crisis, with its dominance of the financial sector, shows
some striking analogies with the workings of the Soviet economy at
the eve of its collapse. State capture by enterprises ‘‘too large to fail’’;
a large ‘‘virtual economy’’ and shadow systems; the inability of
supposedly public agencies to obtain insight into core economic and
financial operations; the short term orientations of actors going against
economic viability; and a ‘‘mystification of societal risk’’ are some of
the family resemblances that will be discussed. To be perfectly clear:
we are not arguing that late Soviet system and financialised capitalism
are in fact somehow empirically similar. What we suggest is that an-
alogical mechanisms were playing out in the hidden abodes of respec-
tively ‘‘state-planning’’ and the ‘‘allocation of capital’’, supposed to be
the control centres and the driving engines of the respective systems.
These mechanisms were flanked, as we shall see, by formally identical
mythologies of high science and material expansion, and the systematic
cultivation of public silences, including the active sidelining of more
historically realistic forms of knowledge.
The mainstream view in the West of the Soviet economy as
characterized by an all-powerful state was based on superficial obser-
vations of the early Soviet economy under Stalin. Western scholars of
socialism have repeatedly shown that this rather abstract and ideologi-
cal idea of a totalitarian and strong state was by and large wrong, not
only in the field of culture but also and especially in the field of the
economy. The Soviet economy was neither adequately planned nor well
controlled (Kornai 1980, Grossman 1977). Rather it was riddled with
contradictions: ubiquitous negotiations on all levels, informality, and
a huge shadow system. Nevertheless the view of the all-powerful state
remained dominant in public opinion in both the West and the East
throughout the Cold War and after it. Similarly, in global and
financialised capitalism, an abstract and ideological view of the econ-
omy, rooted in an outdated ideal type of individual rational actors
navigating anonymous market signals and making optimal decisions in
the allocation of capital and the pursuit of selfish gain, has remained
dominant. It took the current crisis for it to disclose its own shadowy
underside, the shaky basis of its claims to objectivity, and the amazing
measure of oligopolistic control over the state and the public sphere.
It is an open question whether alternative paradigms less enchanted
by methodological individualism can regain some of the terrain
lost.
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We argue that if one looks beyond the discourse of market versus
state, two fundamental similarities in both social economies can be
discerned, which explain the unstable constellation of virtual pro-
duction and shadow economy, creeping state capture, and the related
distortions and perversions. These two similarities are the weakness
of horizontal countervailing powers and an attendant diverse ecology
of institutions and discourses, and the related absence of active
democratic information, deliberation, and public control. In short,
the checks and balances have been dangerously weak in both systems
and public spheres failed to function on both sides. On the institutional
level this translates into a lack of transparency and realism. The perverse
incentives and structural weaknesses as observed in the Soviet pro-
ductive system by authors like Kornai (1980, Kornai et al. 2003) and
Grossman (1977) are also applicable to the financial engines of neoliberal
capitalism in its globalist phase.4 This suggests that the entire edifice of
markets versus hierarchies loses much of its significance. Whether
market based or hierarchy based, monadic non-diversified power and
information structures associated with oligopoly in both systems lead to
the corruption of both. The consequence is state capture, ‘‘regulatory
capture’’, as well as the actual capture of civil society, the public sphere,
and democracy by special interests.
The real functioning of the planned economy: informal structures
The common sense conceptualisation of the Soviet economy, as
characterized by a powerful state with strong control over its enter-
prises and their managers, which uni-directionally determined what
and how much enterprises would produce is incorrect. This view
ignores the informal relations which existed between managers and
4 Janos Kornai himself already argued in
2003 (Kornai et al. 2003) that the phenom-
enon of the ‘‘soft budget constraint’’ (SBC)
that he had encountered in the socialist econ-
omy has applicability beyond the planned
economy. With this concept he described the
phenomenon that the financial situation of
a socialist enterprise did not place a real
constraint on its spending, its borrowing or
its expansion, as managers could count on the
fact that the state would subsidize or bail-out
firms that failed. Kornai recently argued that
mechanisms typical of the socialist economy
(in his case the SBC phenomenon) indeed
explain the financial crisis in theWest (Kornai
2009): ‘‘the SBC syndrome breeds irrespon-
sibility and disdain of risk, and opens the way
to excessive investment hunger and expansion
drive among managers. This in turn makes
financial troubles more frequent and rescue
demands more strident, in other words, soft-
ens the budget constraint’’ (ibid.).
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planning agents, and within which managers had substantial influence
on the formulation of planning targets and prices. Plans, though
‘‘decided’’ top down, were developed on the basis of information and
proposals processed ‘‘down-up’’ by enterprise managements. This led
the Hungarian Imre Vajda to speak of ‘‘commands written by their
recipients’’ (Nove 1980, p. 95). Managers of large enterprises had
substantial bargaining power in their contacts with the planning
apparatus over fulfilment of plans (as will be pointed out later).
Behind the formal, impersonal and hierarchical planning structures
existed the more informal level, with economic transactions embedded
in social and personal relations. Already Berliner (1957) and later
Grossman (1977) and others convincingly argued that the planned
economy could not function without the ‘‘second or shadow econ-
omy’’ of informal relations which oiled the machinery of the planning
apparatus. In addition, later studies by sociologists and anthropol-
ogists have stressed that formal structures and informal relations were
(and still are) very much interwoven (e.g. Ledeneva 1998, 2006).5
Colossal Capital and State Capture
The large size of enterprises was a well known characteristic of the
SovietUnion (SU),with only one or a few companies producing a certain
product. In 1990, industrial enterprises in the SU were over five times
larger than in Western Europe measured in number of employees. If
construction and agro-processing were excluded the difference would be
even more extreme, with enterprises in machine building and metal
working, for instance, over13 times larger (EC1990, p. 36). By the end of
the Soviet period almost three-quarters of Soviet manufacturing
employees worked in firms with more than 1,000 workers, and roughly
one-fifth of them in companies of over 10,000 workers.
Thenegative effects of the large sizeof enterprises in theSUhavebeen
extensively documented by scholars of socialism, especially with regard
to the agro-food sector (e.g. Lerman et al. 2002). In the course of the
Soviet era, enterprises were continuously enlarged. They were trans-
formed into kombinaty, and these were in turn integrated into centrally
managed industrial complexes or obyedineniya. Although much evi-
dence pointed to the inefficiency of this continued enlargement, there
5 After the fall of the planned economy
these informal relations came more to the
fore (Ledeneva 2006, and Spoor and Visser
2004).
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was no debate about reversing this process. On the contrary, when
enterprises performed badly, the universal recipe was the take-over by
a more successful firm, resulting in further enlargement. Even manag-
ers, who could more directly observe the negative effects, strove for
enlargement of their enterprises. They had a personal incentive to do
so, as being director of a larger enterprise meant more prestige, more
influence on the plan and the state, and better chances for their further
career (Kuznetsov 1994, Nove 1980, p.82). Finally, the Soviet state
could not allow bankruptcy because there was usually only one such
a factory in a country or even in the whole Soviet bloc, and large
economic regions depended on their survival.
In the West, although full monopolies have been rare, the problem
of financial organizations simply being ‘‘too big, too complex, and too
interconnected to fail’’ has been powerfully forced into public aware-
ness over the last two years.6 Now it turns out that processes of ‘‘state
capture’’, for which Soviet and post-Soviet countries have been strongly
criticized as one of the crucial obstacles for further social and economic
development, have not been uncommon in the West either. While in the
SU the problem extended throughout the productive economy, in the
contemporary West it is especially pertinent for the financial sector
(though not exclusively so : see the problems associatedwith allowing the
automotive industry to collapse). This difference reflects, of course, the
difference between a ‘‘productivist’’ socialist industrial economy and
a capitalist one driven by global finance and liquidity.
Through mergers and takeovers, Western financial corporations
have become larger and more concentrated, a process that accelerated
in the last decade. There are only three major Wall Street Investment
banks in operation today (five before the collapse of Lehman Brothers
and the integration of Bear Stearns into J. P. Morgan). These five/
three are arguably the actual engines of financialised and globalised
capitalism, the ultimate ‘‘market-makers’’ in Philip Augar’s (2005)
wording. This group of five/three is dominated by just two, Goldman
Sachs and J. P. Morgan. Both have disproportionate influence over the
global banking scene as well as disproportionate political influence
6 This is not only true for the financial
sector. Through mergers and takeovers of
other factories the ‘‘big three’’ car companies
(Ford, GM and Daimler/Chrysler) have be-
come so large that according to their own
estimates, roughly 10 % of all employees in
the US are dependent on these factories and
the related industry for employment. The
US government seemed to have little choice
other than to lend them money to avoid
a countrywide gulf of lay-offs.
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over the state-finance nexus of the American state. Historically it was
J. P. Morgan that served as the anchor for the US financial regime, and
was in fact the cradle from which the Federal Reserve was born. In the
last two decades Goldman Sachs has overshadowed the state-influence
of J. P. Morgan, and has been more of an ‘‘innovative’’ market-maker
worldwide, in particular also with Mortgage Based Derivatives. It has
seen a whole range of its top executives serving important functions in
the state from the early 1990s onwards, the most visible of which were
Robert Rubin and Hank Paulson. After the repeal of the Glass
Steagall Act in the US (1999), deposit taking commercial banks were
also allowed to play in the Investment Banking league, while the
investment bankers could register for the state guarantees that normal
retail banks had been enjoying since the 1930s (as all three of them did
at once in late 2008). Some European retail banks, such as UBS,
Barclays, ING, and Deutsche Bank, started to operate in particular
niches in the investment banking field too, as did numerous smaller
‘‘investment boutiques’’, but all remained critically dependent on the
performance and market-making capacities of the five/three estab-
lished Wall Street giants. Indeed, the repeal of Glass Steagall seems
only to have reinforced the oligopolistic tendencies, from which
Goldman Sachs in particular profited.
Parallel with the increasing tendency toward oligopoly in investment
banking and the growing size and activities of integrated banks, their
share of total capitalist profitability soared. In the 1970s and early 1980s
the US financial sector never earned more than 16 % of total profits; by
2004 it was claiming over 40 % of the profits of corporate America
(Johnson 2009). Goldman Sachs and J. P. Morgan strove for profit
levels on their own equity of 20 to 30 % while profitability outside the
banking sector was practically frozen at around 7 % (Augar 2005).
Earnings and bonuses in the financial sector peaked, outgrowing the
incomes of any other population segment of Western societies, not
unlike in the late 1920s. At the same time, the financial elite successfully
lobbied for minimal taxes. In the City of London, investment banker
Nick Ferguson publicly questioned whether it was not slightly unfair
that he paid less tax than his cleaner (Peston 2008, p. 20). The fierce
competition between global cities such as New York, London and Paris
assured the continuation of low tax regimes for financial corporations
and their specialists, either officially, via loopholes, or through special
statutes. Action against off-shore centres such as Jersey or the Cayman
Islands, if discussed, was never meant to be concerted or fully effective.
Though the contribution of financial operators to the tax bases of small
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finance centres like Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the UK has been
quite substantial (around 10 %), corporations and workers in the non-
finance sectors have consistently been taxed much more heavily than
operators in the financial markets, even though the latter’s earnings and
profits have massively outgrown all the rest.7 More than 400 ex-
members of the House and the Senate now work among Washington’s
army of lobbyists for the financial services, assuring very effective
influence by big finance on the US regulatory environment, which
exerts in its turn tangible pressure on other global financial locations.
The handful of global financial operators, who undeniably indulged
in excessive risk taking, could comfortably do so because they insured
their investment risks via Credit Default Swaps and other Collater-
alized Debt Obligations with an even smaller handful of ‘‘insurers of
last resort’’, in particular AIG. AIG, now nationalized by the Obama
administration, became in effect the heavily underfunded welfare state
for global financial capitalists, guaranteeing their assets against un-
foreseen all-over-the-board deflation. That deflation, however, was
largely unexpected. There was a lack of reliable modelling of highly
interrelated correlations and the absence of historical data basically
meant that all modelling was simply based on assumptions of continued
growth in all or most sectors of the economy, including housing and
banking, reflecting the last few years of a credit driven boom.
After the nationalization of AIG, billions of US state injections in
AIG immediately flowed into the global investment banks, including
non-US banks such as ING, as part of contractual obligations associated
with Credit Default Swaps. After the short experiment with the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Western states decided they could
not let any more financial giants go out of business as the entire global
financial system and the financial systems of multiple individual
countries would collapse. AIG was in fact the most important of all
these institutions and had to be rescued at once (on the Monday after the
Sunday that Lehman was allowed to collapse). While Goldman and
others dumped their greatest risks onto AIG, AIG in the final instance
dumped them on the State Treasury. Similar processes of concentration
have been even more pronounced in smaller highly financialised
countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK.
7 The UK, after bailing out several of its
largest banks, and in an effort to counter the
dramatic and rapid decline of state finances,
has increased the personal taxation of the
higher earners (to standards that are still
below those on the continent) and reduced
loopholes for expat bankers in 2010.
178
oane visser and don kalb
In the Netherlands the outstanding obligations of the largest bank, ING,
were twice the GNP of the whole country. This outstrips the importance
of any industry in the Soviet Union. The most dramatic example was
Iceland, where the liabilities of the main banks were several times the
country’s GNP.
The ratings agencies have always been imagined as a publicly
accountable bulwark against the financial sector’s potential speculative
behaviour. They were thought to analyze and evaluate risk with
reliable precision. This, of course, did not occur. The first implosion
of the banks was caused exactly by the supposedly least risky assets on
their balance sheets, the AAA rated ‘‘super senior risk’’ (Tett 2009).
The models of the ratings agencies, just like the models the investment
banks used, could not deal with all the unpredictable correlations
involved in a full deflationary crisis, as analysts conceded. Moreover,
since mortgage derivatives were such a recent innovation, there were
no reliable time series to feed their models with. More crucially,
ratings agencies are paid and owned by the very investment banks and
investors (Warren Buffet and the media tycoon Rupert Murdoch for
example, who also owns the Wall Street Journal, an important
business paper) for which they do the work, and they are therefore
a part of the system, not quite the independent state-like watch dogs
the public imagines them to be. The rating of escalating numbers of
derivative products during a financial expansion was immensely
lucrative. By 2005 it already accounted for half the earnings of
Moody’s, for example (Tett 2009, p. 119). Moreover, since the ratings
agencies were dealing with just a small oligopoly of banks, they were
very vulnerable to pressure ‘‘from above’’. Tett writes that the
investment banks ‘‘constantly threatened to boycott the agencies if
they failed to produce the wished-for ratings’’ (ibid., p. 119). The
ratings agencies, just like accountancy firms a few years earlier in the
fraudulent Enron and Worldcom collapses, postured as the hand-
maiden of an imagined ‘‘objective’’ state but had in fact become part of
the financialised machine, just like other parts of the state-finance nexus.
They were as much gripped by greed as any insider, and exploited their
position as ‘‘flex-organizations’’ (Wedel 2004) on the blurred boundaries
between state/public and private sector.
In August 2008, just a month before the great implosion, in a letter
accompanying a commissioned report on the US banking sector for
Hank Paulson, Minister of Finance, Jerry Corrigan, a former New York
FED chief now working for an investment bank, wrote that ‘‘elevated
financial statesmanship’’ was needed in the banking industry, but he
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lamented that ‘‘there appeared to be precious few such bankers left’’
(Tett, 2009, p. 268). Not more than a month later, the absence as well as
the urgency of such ‘‘elevated financial statesmanship’’ finally combined
and occasioned what one should perhaps call ‘‘open state capture’’ by big
finance: a three page document by Paulson, not meant to be discussed
openly, was sufficient to create a 700 billion dollar bail-out fund,
available at once and operating under full ministerial discretion, forcibly
underwritten by a national public excluded from decision-making.8
A not entirely dissimilar plot played out in Europe in May 2010.
After having received a personal letter from the leaders of the 25
biggest European banks on the Friday before their meeting, and after
telephone calls by the Head of the IMF and President Obama, top
EU leaders decided entirely unexpectedly to create a similar 750
billion Euro guarantee fund to bail out states in the European Union
whose budgets were bankrupted by the financial crisis. These public
monies are not supposed to help weaker European Union states, in
spite of the rhetoric, but rather, in the revealing words of a former
President of the Bundesbank, Karl Otto Poehl, ‘‘to save the
European banks’’ whose sovereign loans to the Southern tier might
not get repaid (Spiegel International, 03/06/2010). As in the US,
large public guarantees were extended for banking assets, loans and
claims. The public was forced to save the big banks from deflation in
a situation of threatened insolvency.
We suggest that the financial crises of 2007-2010 brought the fact
of state capture by big finance into the open by at once forcing
Western states, in the space of a few days and without democratic
deliberation, to use hundreds of billions of future tax incomes to re-
capitalize the whole system and guarantee outstanding credits to their
owners, without allowing much pay-back or roll-back. AIG, indeed,
was quickly allowed to be nationalized, as well as some big but less
crucial players in smaller Western countries. But after the money grab
the financial institutions on the whole, including the nationalized ones,
have allowed very little say to politicians in return. Nor, tellingly, have
politicians concertedly pressed for greater control, emphasizing that
these new state properties should be quickly returned ‘‘to the market’’
after their insolvency had been reversed by public funds. Indeed,
8 By the time of final submission of this
article, July 2010, the exact expenditures and
recipients of the TARP were still not made
public.MichaelMoore’s documentary ‘‘Capi-
talism, a Love Story’’, 2010, features an
interview with the Chairperson of one of
the parliamentary supervisory committees
of the state finances in which she exclaims
in embarrassment that she has no idea what
the TARP money was used for.
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these were largely the same political personnel that had previously
given the banks free rein.9
Despite profound anger, the wider public has been surprisingly
unable or reluctant to recognize the hard fact of state-capture, and has
instead allowed itself to be deflected by moral outrage over isolated
scandals in the markets and unjustified bonuses for individual bankers
paid from their tax money (the limited public recognition regarding
state-capture will be discussed in more detail later on). In Europe in
2010, Greek street protests were certainly fierce. But they addressed
a state that had become completely powerless, while the wider European
public was more concerned with the identity politics of deserving and
undeserving Europeans than ready to grasp how the fragmented
European political landscape had been captured by big finance. That
finance was securing the full repayment of its sovereign credit portfolio
at the cost of durable public stagnation and serious mid-term repercus-
sions for the European project.
Thus, state capture in theWest was hardly recognized until recently,
except for some left wing academics (Arrighi 1994, 2000, Sassen 1998)
and alter-globalization voices (e.g. Hertz 2001). In fact, if you put
‘‘state capture’’ in your internet search engine you will see that the
World Bank and other global institutions reserve the concept exclu-
sively for poor countries in the Global South and the countries of the
former Soviet Union. The concept is meant to explain a lack of
economic performance, openness and transparency among corrupt
countries that are dependent on the export of a single crop, com-
modity or mineral. We would argue that the one-sided growth of
finance in the West in the last thirty years has produced similar de-
differentiations of a prior more complex and variegated social and
economic ecology in the West, and made core states ever more de-
pendent on one single sector, giving this sector ever more prestige and
power. Indeed, Simon Johnson, a former IMF Chief Economist now
9 The US ‘‘Congressional Agreement on
Financial Reform’’ leaves much of the juris-
prudence of banking reform to the regula-
tors, which used to be thoroughly colonized
by big finance. Van Duyn and Guerrera of
the Financial Times therefore conclude con-
vincingly that the ‘‘Dodd-Frank bill is no
Glass-Steagall’’ (FT 27-6-2010). The Basle
Rules for ‘‘tier one capital’’, meanwhile, will
be phased in slowly and differently over
different jurisdictions, meaning again that
the local regulators will be heavily exposed
to the influence of local banks. Parts of the
shadow banking system, however, might be
dismantled as ‘‘over the counter trans-
actions’’ on which it was built will be regu-
lated onto official exchanges. Tellingly, the
key informants of financial journalists at the
moment are often ex-regulators who now
already work for big consultancy firms, sug-
gesting that the well-paid quest for major
legal loopholes and exemptions is already on
before the proposals are turned into law.
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openly calls them ‘‘banana economies’’ (Johnson 2009) and his recent
book is tellingly entitled ‘‘13 bankers’’, graphically signalling oligopo-
listic control over the state-finance nexus in the US (Johnson and Kwak
2010). Any recent study of the ‘‘liberalization’’ of finance over the last
three decades highlights the prevalence of ‘‘regulatory capture’’ (see
Kay 2009 for a review) as big finance was allowed to write its own
operating rules under Greenspan’s mantra of the market knows best.
But beyond regulatory capture, which given limited space we will not
discuss here, we argue that it makes analytic sense to talk about state
capture by finance tout court. Or as Willem Buiter, a former member of
the monetary committee of the Bank of England wrote, finance was
‘‘almost a law unto itself’’ (Financial Times 01/09/2009).
Virtual Economy
Individual greed and corruption have mostly been painted as excep-
tions or personal excesses in both financialised capitalism and the Soviet
system. In reality, they are not just personal attributes but systemic
properties intimately linked to fundamental characteristics of both sys-
tems, inparticular thegeneralizedshort-termismandthespreadofavirtual
economy.Continuing and increasing pressure formaterial expansion in an
economy where the productive base is increasingly under-invested or
obsolete (the SU) stimulates managers to create virtual production. In
both systems managers have an incentive to create ‘‘quantifiable’’ but
largely ‘‘paper-based’’ production to satisfy actors outside the enterprise
(the state in the Soviet Union, and investors in the West).
In the SovietUnion short-termproduction increaseswere generated
artificially bycreatingproductionfigures (or at least statistics suggesting
such production) to fulfil state quota. As Nove (1980, p. 49) notes, the
SU was known as being ‘‘obsessed with the future, being ever ready to
sacrifice the present to it, as may be seen by the high rate of
investment and the priority of producers’ goods. [...] But, paradoxi-
cally, given the adaptation of ambitious plans for growth, the choices
made and decisions taken reflect above all immediate concerns’’.
Despite the ideological orientation on pyatiletki (the five year plans),
both managers and officials were in practice increasingly oriented
towards short-term performance. As Nove (1980, p. 49) stated at that
time: ‘‘They are in trouble if they do not raise the production in this
year’s plan and it is easy to see that longer-term orientations can
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conflict with this objective’’. This was especially acute at the enterprise
management level. Yearly plans were sometimes adjusted top down in
December of the year to which they applied (ibid., p. 40). Manager’s
time-horizons were strongly affected by the likelihood of not keeping
a position for long. The focus on quantitative indicators of performance
further stimulated short-term opportunistic behaviour, including out-
right corruption by whole enterprises. Firms secretly kept their surplus
production (production above the quota established by the planning
apparatus), and did not include it in the accounts for the state (Granick
1954, p. 132), in order to insert it into the officially registered output at
times when an enterprise would otherwise be unable to meet the plan, or
to exchange it for shortage goods within the shadow economy. Through
such informal barter, enterprises were able to obtain unregistered inputs
or spare parts. Humphrey (1998) called the hidden production the
‘‘manipulable resources’’. These resources could be used by the enter-
prise management to load on or load off from the registered production
at strategic moments to gain incidental enterprise level bonuses [and,
mostly hidden personal favours or career perspectives] for good perfor-
mance while avoiding state knowledge of actual production capacity
which would lead to permanently higher production targets. In sum,
‘‘[ac]counting secrets were the best hidden secret, despite the many
indicators, the actual state of affairs remained mostly obscure’’ to the
planning authorities and society at large (Broekmeyer 1995, p. 81).
The lack of insight in the real economy, and subsequently the
limited ability to monitor, was true on all levels. The problematic
labour performance of Soviet employees was well known. Alcohol and
a lack of motivation were increasingly widespread. The central appa-
ratus had little insight in the real productive capacity of enterprises.
Managers of these enterprises in turn had very limited insight in the
real functioning of the units within them, as branch/unit heads as well
as workers themselves had an incentive to hide their real performance
and capacities from people higher up in the hierarchy. The overarching
pattern of pretence was aptly summarized in the Soviet joke: ‘‘workers
pretend to work and the state pretends to pay them’’.
The reputation and career prospects of industrial managers de-
pended first and for all on their production figures (Kuznetsov 1994,
p. 962), and this was true also for the agricultural sector. ‘‘The main
concern of a bad kolkhoz chairman was: to fulfil the plans on paper and
not disturb the relations with the rayon or province. How the harvest
was in reality, was of secondary importance, and the consequences for
the people were of even less importance’’ (Broekmeyer 1995, p. 80). As
183
financialised capitalism soviet style?
employees had minimal formal influence on enterprise issues, it was easy
for managers to ignore their objections. In particular, recently appointed
directors or chairmen had ‘‘many opportunities for window dressing,
and consequently virtual success’’ (Broekmeyer 1995, p.79 citing
a Russian source on the Russian agrofood sector).10
In the West a comparable virtual economy has been created
through business reports and favourable stock exchange values (often
through fraud; see Enron, Worldcom, Ahold) that bear little resemblance
to real production. Most corporations, under pressure of shareholders to
show short-term improvements without the necessary base of invest-
ments, often extended their quarterly reports during the 2000s. Whereas
enterprises initially only made prognoses of profit per share and turnover,
now they mostly felt obliged to predict these figures in detail, separately
for all their divisions. This spectacle of three-monthly figures, analyses
and predictions gave a strong incentive to practise short-term policy and
doubtful accountancy practices which were not entirely unlike the
situation in the Soviet economy.
Mystification of Risk
Thevirtual economy inboth theSUand theWestwasnot only virtual
because of unrealistic production and/or profit indices; it also gave
misleading signals/information about risks. Probably the most destruc-
tive aspect of the lack of realism associated with the virtual economy in
both systems is what we would call the ‘‘mystification of risk’’. In the
Soviet Union, managers and their enterprises did not feel the effects of
the risks they took. The state normally did not allow enterprises to go
bankrupt. In the case of enterprise failure the state simply increased
subsidies or forced a more successful enterprise to merge with it. As
a consequence, it seemed that risk, bad performance and failure did not
exist. Both enterprise managers and state officials kept pretending that
the economy functionedwell, and that misleading production plans and
figures reflected the real economy. Enterprise failure and stagnating
production were compensated by increased lending. However, the debts
of the Soviet and East European states with Western institutions grew
10 The idea of a largely virtual economy
that has little relation to, and hides, a much
smaller, and intransparant, real economy also
appeared in analyses of the post-Soviet era.
Gaddy and Ickes (1998) introduced the con-
cept of the ‘‘virtual economy’’ to describe the
state of affairs in Russia just before the
financial crisis of 1998.
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enormously. By the early 1980s the debt burden became so large (over 90
billion dollars in the case of the SU, 40 billion for Poland, 25 billion for
Hungary etc., the GDR paid 60 % of its yearly export incomes to West
German creditors) and the prospects for generating sufficient export
income in an increasingly hyper-competitive world economy to ever pay
it back became so negative, that Western banks began to refuse to roll
over their loans. As a consequence, state-elites were forced to start
serious economic restructuring which indeed finally resulted in in-
creasing disaffection and ultimately the end of the planned economy.
In the West, especially in the US and UK, as in the SU until the
credit stop by the West, an internationally declining manufacturing
sector was hidden by increased international borrowing. Risk taking in
the financial sector (but also in society at large), increased sharply in
the 1990s and 2000s, but, as in the Soviet Union, managers and their
companies rarely took full responsibility for the risk. Risk was spread
throughout the whole economy via financial engineering. What
happened through complicated bureaucratic state procedures in the
SU, eventuated via complex financial instruments in a deregulated
global economy in the West. Bankers became ultra creative in their
efforts to slice, dice, redistribute and even literally hide risk, while
households and firms eagerly took up the loans offered to them on the
assumption of endless growth. Overall indebtedness in the West,
consequently, has reached phenomenal and unique proportions.
In the 2000s a crucial new but hidden feature was added to the
financial system that further multiplied risk. It was only in 2006 that
reporters, in particular the anthropologist Gillian Tett (Tett 2009),
working for the Financial Times, started to alert the wider public to the
existence of escalating global debts that were literally hidden away in
what Tett called the ‘‘shadow banking system’’. Credit derivatives based
on mortgages had been introduced in 2001 and were booming. These
liabilities, however, were immediately shifted from the public balance
sheets of banks into ‘‘off balance sheet vehicles’’, which, by 2006, were
hiding some 20 trillion dollars in debt from public scrutiny (it would
double in the years until late 2007, coming close to annual US GDP).
These debts went far beyond what could be warranted by the capital
bases of the banks; some of them were taking on a hidden leverage of 25
or 30 times their own equity while their official leverage remained well
within the Basle rules of 10 %. In a G8 meeting in Washington in April
2007, some months before Lehman brothers collapsed, state officials
from the G8 were interviewing hedge fund managers, who, as the
unregulated part of the global financial system, were supposed to be the
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ones causing risk (recall the drama with LTCM in 1998). However one
of them explained in no uncertain words to the officials that; ‘‘it is not us
you should be worrying about – it’s the banks! It is the regulated bits of
the system you should worry about’’ (Tett 2009, pp.190-191). Officials
did not yet understand that regulated banks had been operating a huge
covert system that was going to blow up soon.11 The ticking time-bomb
was the increase of interest rates which would inevitably come. As it
happened, it came in response to staggering speculation by the same
actors in oil and basic commodities (‘‘futures’’), partly a ‘‘flight to
safety’’. This speculation was driving up basic prices for all economies in
2007-2008 and creating the first generalized global concern about
insufficient food supplies and famine throughout the system for the
first time since the 1960s.12
The immediate cause that triggered the financial crisis was the
interest rate on sub-prime mortgages, which was going up exactly at
the moment that housing prices started to fall, driving mortgage
holders into insolvency. It turned out that not only banks had
pretended to be more liquid and reliable than they actually were,
house owners, too, had pretended to earn more income than they
actually did (often invited to do so by brokers driven by perverse
incentive structures). The Soviet joke of workers pretending to work
while the state was pretending to pay them comes to mind. Applied to
the current capitalist context it reads: ‘‘Debtors pretend they can pay
their debts and banks pretend that they have the money to lend’’.
Orthodoxy, Unquestioned Modelling and Capture Beyond the State
In the SU perverse processes could not fundamentally be corrected
within the existing institutional framework, as the communist ideol-
ogy was dominant, and opposition parties, independent academia, and
11 It was not only risk taking itself (and the
resulting losses) but especially the lack of trans-
parency of the risks (the hidden losses) that
caused the global financial crisis (Swedberg
2010). In the case of the Lehman brothers
bankruptcy and the start of the crisis financial
in the US (ibid.), as well as with the disclosure
of the Greek government budget deceit, it was
the fact that losses were hidden, that lead to
a sharp decline in confidence within the finan-
cial sector which spread far beyond the par-
ticular bank and/or country and related actors.
12 For an analysis of the financialisation of
the food sector and the political economy of
‘‘food shortages’’ and price hikes in food, see
McMichael (2009). He shows that while de-
veloping countries faced price hikes and food
riots, and farmers increasingly experienced
price scissors, multinationals and investors in
the food trade saw sharp rises in profitability.
The impact of the financialisation of the food
sector for post-Soviet countries, through the
phenomenon of international ‘‘land grabbing’’,
is analysed in Visser and Spoor (2011).
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free media were not allowed. In the West, the ‘‘silence’’ of society
regarding the enrichment, excessive risk taking and state capture by an
oligopolistic financial sector, needs more explanation. The dominance
of the financial sector was not only a result of the powerful lobby by
the financial corporations (recall the 400 ex mp’s) with their enormous
market concentration, but it was also enhanced by the way the
orthodoxies of neo-liberalism, ‘‘market fundamentalism’’ in George
Soros’ words (2008), were taken over by state administrations, control-
ling and rating agencies, as well as themedia and large parts of academia
in the last three decades (see also for the ‘‘success’’ of neoliberalism,
Friedman 2010). The presentation of absolutist figures and compli-
cated models with the aura of the high sciences played an important
role in the game of managers and planners in convincing external
actors (the state or shareholders) of their firm grasp of reality.
In the Soviet Union the real mechanisms behind such planning
statistics, models and decisions were completely obscure. Although
statistics on national, regional and enterprise level were presented in
a very absolutist way, the planning of production was actually based
on a ‘‘process of iteration, bluff, counter-bluff and misinformation
between planners and enterprise managers, in which central planners
routinely assumed that real production costs were less than enterprise
managements claimed they were, and enterprise managements tried,
in turn, to ‘second guess’/influence what the prices were going to be
by manipulating production costs’’ (Kitching 2001, p.69).
In the West the operations of hedge funds and banks in the late
1990s and early 2000s, were increasingly characterized by similar
phenomena: statistics, modelling and decision-making, with little
grounding in reality. It seems that the controlling agencies in the West
were more naı¨ve in their monitoring of enterprises than the Soviet state.
Key persons in controlling agencies maintained an unlimited belief in
the indicators and models provided by the financial sector, including
the Value At Risk equations that were pioneered by Morgan Stanley.13
Thus analysts, controlling institutions and rating agencies such as
Standards and Poor and Moody’s (‘‘the emperor’s legitimacy’’) exulted
in myths of objective control with two figures behind the comma.
Public ignorance in the West about creeping state capture by the
finance sector above all testifies to the all-encompassing influence of
13 Ben Bernanke, head of the US Federal
Bank, stated in 2006; ‘‘the management of
market risk and credit risk has become in-
creasingly sophisticated [...] Banking organ-
izations of all size have made substantial
strides over the past two decades in their
ability to measure and manage risks’’
(Johnson 2009, p.10).
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neo-liberal thought (supportedby thebelief infiguresandmodels) over the
media, which in this respect has dramatically reduced its role as a critical
fourth force, among others because of similar processes of privatisation,
concentration and oligopoly as we saw in the financial sector. News-
papers and TV channels were bought up or launched by the financial
elite (Murdoch, Kirch, Berlusconi, not much unlike what happened in
Russia after the fall of the SU) and it would be hard to find examples of
mainstream media in the West that have been consistently critical of
finance-driven growth and the neoliberalisation of social life. The British
financial journalist Peston (2008, p.14), is a rare example of a journalist
who (already before the financial crisis), recognized self-reflexively that
he had acted merely as ‘‘a cheerleader of the €uber-capitalists’’.
Here again, the similarity with the Soviet system comes to the fore.
Of course we are not suggesting that the independence of the press in
late capitalism is as constrained as in the Soviet era. However, with
regard to the economy, the media played a similar role: orchestrating
silence and loyalty. Signs of the fundamental flaws of the system were
presented as instances of deplorable individual greed, moral hazard,
fraud or corruption and were pictured as exceptional excesses that
would be punished. It left the status quo largely undisputed. Recall
how Gorbachev ultimately focused only on worker alcoholism and the
corruption of individual managers when he was supposedly carrying
out glasnost and perestroika of the system as such.
As a result of insufficient information, analysts, politicians, trade
unions and NGOs representing the population outside the financial
sector, have been unable to address core problems within the global
system such as state capture by big finance, speculation, global trade
imbalances and financial imbalances, let alone the less overt but even
more fundamental overall global decline of social wages compared to
the incomes derived from capital. Some of these issues have now come
on the agenda of the G20, in particular the global imbalances, which
reflects the interests of the US state, though much of the exercises of
the G20 remain mired in neoliberal orthodoxy and the mythical belief
in the return to ‘‘normality’’ of endless growth. One of the functions
of neoliberalism in the last decades was to keep national publics
frantically focused on their own national budgets and their national
competitiveness among the global players (Brender and Pisani 2009
for the systemic and fatal lack of global vantage points in banking, and
Martin Wolf for the ingrained ‘‘passing the parcel’’ in the global
economy, FT 29-6-2010). Ultimately, the obsession with winning the
competitiveness game has led to a weakening power of the public – so
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deeply fragmented over national jurisdictions and associated interests
and viewpoints – vis-a`-vis global capital.14
The silencing of civil society and institutions also included think
tanks and universities, which became increasingly dependent on
external funding, disbursed through peer review mechanisms that are
based on professional consensus. Policy relevance and scientific con-
sensus, privileging a strong quantitative or model-based approach to
society, was favoured over pluralism, contestation, and deliberation fed
by a diverse ecology of universities, research groups, intellectuals, and
other institutions. Only recently, with the downfall of the financial
system, are scientists who warned of the almost sacral, mythical belief
in statistics and models being heard (see for instance Taleb 2008). This
may offer a window of opportunity for alternative insights and broader
visions on markets and economics, such as those based on fractals and
chaos theory (Mandelbrot and Hudson 2004); the historical studies on
bubbles and financial crises; on the global analysis of hegemonic cycles;
and in general on an ‘‘expanded institutionalism’’.
Conclusions
The comparison between financialised capitalism and late Soviet
socialism suggests that the origins of the current crisis might be more
profound than many observers think. If our analysis is correct, it
means that measures and calls for ethics, more controlling agencies
and rules within the financial sector cannot be sufficient. The
comparison with the Soviet planned economy strongly suggests that
the problems underlying the financial crisis are deeply engrained in
the wider economy and society. Fundamental problems of market
concentration, oligopoly, lack of transparency of financial markets, and
the near sacral belief in statistics and models have been discussed here,
as well as the wider capture of state and society (media, politics,
academia). More theoretically, the comparison suggests that the whole
edifice of markets versus hierarchies loses its significance. As Nove
(1980, p. 50) notes ‘‘[t]he traditional socialist view has been that
capitalism subordinates long-term economic and social health to the
14 Moreover, large constituencies in theWest
compensated their stagnating relative incomes
with easy credit and therefore became depen-
dent on low interest rates and further financial-
ization.Political elites, too, found it comfortable
to sponsor easy credit formation and low in-
terest rates in order to prevent anydiscussion of
stagnating relative incomes.
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immediate profit motive’’. The current crisis has concealed that this is
certainly true for financialised global capitalism. At the same time our
comparison also showed that while the Soviet economy was known for
its orientation towards the future, in reality it was driven by similar
short-termism, which in turn stimulated fraud and corruption.
Regardless of whether it concerns pure-market or pure hierarchy-
systems, a concentration of power and information (as described in this
article) leads to a lack of stransparency and democratic control and to
internal corruption. The consequence of the monadic non-diversified
power and information structures in both systems is state capture by
insider interests, as well as the capture of ‘‘civil society’’ and public
institutions. Due to this, the lack of realism in the behaviour by the main
economic players is not openly signalled or criticized until the imminent
dangers of a systemic downfall can no longer be denied. The emperor is
then suddenly without clothes, and all players are caught in uncertainty
and fear.
Not only the origins, but also the collapse and its aftermath might
be structurally analogous. In the Soviet Union, when the emperor lost
his clothes, nobody knew what the state assets were actually worth and
where the real value was produced. Enterprises were privatized to
unleash entrepreneurship and innovation and to raise investment. In
the first stage of privatization, assets were distributed among the
public (in the form of vouchers) and employees (as direct shares), in
what the reformers and their Western advisors claimed was an equal
and empowering form of privatization (see e.g. Aslund 1995). How-
ever, it was only the well-connected elite which had the inside
information to distinguish the diamonds among the rusty crumbling
industries who were able to buy up controlling share packages on the
cheap in the most valuable production processes (see e.g. Barnes
2006). ‘‘Nomenklatura appropriation’’ led to further concentration of
power and wealth rather than less. Most people only gained a few
days’ pay for selling their assets to the elite, while their influence on
the enterprises as employees diminished compared with the Soviet era
(ibid. and see Visser 2006, 2008 for such developments in the
countryside; Kalb 2009 for similar insights into Poland and for the
popular politics that emerges from such trajectories).15
15 Protests by the population against those
processes of accumulation has been very
limited, with both the urban (Clarke 1998,
Greskovits 1998) and rural populations
(Visser 2009) throwing their weight on alter-
native, informal income generating activities,
such as semi-subsistence food production.
190
oane visser and don kalb
In the West the shadow banking system, when at the point of
imminent collapse was moved without any democratic discussion onto
the debt balance of Western states, which is now again back to where it
was at the beginning of the neoliberal era around 1980 or even higher
(more than 100 % average state indebtedness is projected for the
OECD in a few years from now). Thus in the end the mystification of
risk turned out to be a more advanced form of the old capitalist
principle of privatization of profit and socialization of costs.16 While
Western populations are facing a new cycle of unemployment, public
expenditure cuts and neo-liberal efficiency-drives to cope with falling
demand and stepped up global competition, the key players in the
financial sector seem to have come out of the crisis stronger than
before. J. P. Morgan (which became even larger through the in-
tegration of Bear Stearns) and Goldman Sachs, rejected government
control or even intensified monitoring, paid back their government
loans, and are making impressive profits again on the basis of zero-
interest borrowing from central banks. They are also again paying
their employees large bonuses while rejecting any global regulation of
pay and transactions beyond their immediate self-interest. Nor are
politicians and Western publics asking for much more. This is
nomenklatura appropriation financialised capitalist style. In sum, in
the West just as in the former Soviet Union, without more robust
public and democratic control, anti-crisis measures tend to lead to
renewed accumulation by dispossession (Harvey 2003) and a further
shift of public resources into private hands.
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet
Union in 1991 were widely celebrated in the West as the ultimate
evidence of the universal validity of the premises of ‘‘democratic’’
capitalism (e.g. Fukuyama 1992), and the outdated nature of leftist
thought. Consequently, financialised capital and the well-funded
proponents of neo-liberalism obtained even more leeway to further
deregulate the West, and spread deregulated capitalism around the
globe. The West would have done itself and the world a better service
by studying the functioning of the Soviet system as well as its own
evolving financialised structures in a less cold war inflected way. It
could have learnt from the mechanisms that led to the Soviet fall by
16 This principle is well known to scholars
of historical property transformations in the
West, such as the English enclosure move-
ment, the United States during the settler
appropriation of American-Indian land and
more recently the privatization in post-Soviet
Russia (Kingston-Mann 2006).
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comparing them to its own accumulating systemic flaws, rather than
celebrating the Soviet demise for two decades in self-congratulatory
mode due to its supposed eternal and virtuous equilibrium.
Finally, on a different note, it should be added that post-Soviet and
postsocialist countries have been the ones experiencing the most
destructive effects of the current crisis. Countries like Russia and
Kazakhstan had booming economies until the middle of 2008, fuelled
by cheap credit and global demand for their exports, but were hit
unexpectedly hard when the crisis arrived at the end of that year. The
stock exchange in Moscow fell more dramatically than in the US,
unemployment went up rapidly above 10 %, and the Russian decline
in GDP was most severe of all G20 countries (Nezavizamaya Gazeta,
1 October 2009). In Romania, for example, draconian cuts of 25 % in
public salaries are now being imposed by a political elite that remains
intellectually focused on the ‘‘crimes of communism’’ and practically
dedicated to sustaining the lowest flat tax rate in Europe to help its
entrepreneurs. The current crisis of the West, reflecting some in-
teresting and unexpected analogies with the Soviet downfall, is poor
consolation for its victims east of the Oder and the Leitha.
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L’hypothe`se defendue est que le capitalisme
financier de 2008 presentait de frappantes
analogies avec l’economie sovietique a` la
veille de son effondrement. On examinera la
mise en coupe reglee de l’E´tat par les oligo-
poles, l’imposture de l’economie virtuelle,
l’incapacite des agences de controˆle a` suivre
les operations financie`res, la focalisation des
managers sur le court terme au detriment de
la viabilite a` long terme de l’entreprise, le
traitement mystificateur du risque par la
mathematique financie`re. Outre les origines
de la crise actuelle, on peut avancer que les
lendemains prolongent les analogies.
Mots cles: Capitalisme, E´conomie planifiee,
Crise financie`re, Captation de l’E´tat, E´cono-
mie informelle.
Zusammenfassung
Die Finanzkrise 2008 scheint, so die Arbeit-
shypothese, €Ahnlichkeiten mit dem sowjeti-
schen Wirtschaftssystem kurz vor seinem
Zusammenbruch aufzuweisen. Untersucht
werden die Unterwerfung des Staates durch
die Oligarchen, der Betrug der virtuellen
Wirtschaft, die Unf€ahigkeit der Kontroll-
organe die Finanzgesch€afte zu verfolgen, die
kurzfristige Planung auf unternehmerischer
Seite, der mystische Umgang der Wirtschaft-
mathematik mit dem Risiko. Nicht nur die
Urspr€unge der Krise sondern auch die Fol-
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